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Abstract—The introduction of robots into our society
will also introduce new concerns about personal privacy.
In order to study these concerns, we must do human-
subject experiments that involve measuring privacy-
relevant constructs. This paper presents a taxonomy of
privacy constructs based on a review of the privacy liter-
ature. Future work in operationalizing privacy constructs
for HRI studies is also discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the future, robots promise to become perva-
sive in our society, if not ubiquitous. Already the
advent of the Internet, webcams, and affordable
mobile devices has changed the way we think
about personal privacy; robots, many of which
can move around the world, will further change
this paradigm. Whereas webcams are tethered to
stationary computers and mobile devices are car-
ried by people, robots can go places and collect
data without direct human aid, and perhaps even
unbeknownst to humans altogether. This poses a
new threat to personal privacy in all its senses:
control over private information, the right not to
be recorded, personal space and solitude, and so
on.
We call the study of privacy issues in robotics
and how to mitigate them, “privacy-sensitive
robotics.” This area of research itself probably
belongs in the field of human-robot interaction, or
HRI. In order to study privacy-sensitive robotics,
we must do human-subject experiments; tackling
a human-robot interaction problem without con-
sulting the humans is a doomed endeavor. The
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problem is, “privacy” has many meanings, so
testing hypotheses about “privacy” is impossible
without being much more specific and choosing
just a small part of “privacy” to work with. This
paper presents a breakdown of “privacy” into many
constructs (i.e., abstract ideas) organized into a
hierarchical taxonomy based on a review of the
privacy literature.
II. BACKGROUND: ROBOTS AND PRIVACY
Privacy-sensitive robotics can be thought of as
a subset of human-robot interaction. Goodrich and
Schultz have surveyed human-robot interaction [1]
and Fong has surveyed socially-interactive robots
[2]. The focus in both of these surveys is on au-
tonomous robot behaviors, although in some cases,
autonomy is shared between the human and the
robot. Why do autonomous robots pose a privacy
concern for humans? Research has revealed that
humans often interact socially with machines. This
phenomenon is often stated as “Computers Are
Social Actors” (CASA) [3]. Any robot, then, can
function as a social actor during a human-robot in-
teraction. Broad discussions of privacy issues that
are specific to robotics are only recently beginning
to be published, especially outside of the robotics
discipline. Calo gives a good overview as well as
some newer insights [4].
Privacy is important in all human cultures [5],
although different cultures have different norms
for privacy and different mechanisms for enforcing
those norms.
Unfortunately, people are not always rational
when they make decisions about privacy [6]. Re-
searchers have even had to measure privacy atti-
tudes separately from privacy behaviors because of
how poorly people put their privacy preferences
into action [7]. In research, the value of privacy
is often quantified in monetary terms, and has
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been shown to depend on the context (i.e., whether
privacy protection is being increased or decreased
[8]).
If robots can function as social actors in
whichever human culture they inhabit, we want to
study how we can enculturate robots with respect
to our privacy norms. We call research that studies
these questions “privacy-sensitive robotics.”
III. A TAXONOMY OF PRIVACY CONSTRUCTS
FOR HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTIONS
This section lays out our taxonomy of privacy
constructs and summarizes the key literature be-
hind it. Definitions of terms are to be found via
the references where not defined hereafter. The
taxonomy is as follows:
1) Privacy (see Leino-Kilpi et al. [9] for subdi-
vision)
a) Informational (see Solove [10] for sub-
division)
i) Invasion
ii) Collection
iii) Processing
iv) Dissemination
b) Physical
i) Personal Space [11]
ii) Territoriality [11], [12], [13] (see
Altman [14] for subdivision)
A) Intrusion
B) Obtrusion
C) Contamination
iii) Modesty [15]
c) Psychological
i) Interrogation [11]
ii) Psychological Distance [16]
d) Social
i) Association [15]
ii) Crowding/Isolation [14]
iii) Public Gaze [17]
iv) Solitude [15] (see Westin [11] for
subdivision)
v) Intimacy
vi) Anonymity
vii) Reserve
A. The Literature behind the Taxonomy
We recommend the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy article on privacy by Judith DeCew
as a comprehensive guide to the definition of
privacy [18], especially in law and philosophy.
Most of the references in this section we owe to
the bibliography from that article.
1.a-d Leino-Kilpi et al. [9] divide privacy as
follows:
1) Physical privacy, over personal space or ter-
ritory
2) Psychological privacy, over thoughts and
values
3) Social privacy, over interactions with others
and influence from them
4) Informational privacy, over personal infor-
mation
1.a.i-iv Informational privacy refers to privacy
concerns about personal information. In 1960,
William Prosser divided (informational) privacy
into four parts. His formulation continues to be
referenced today. Briefly, Prosser divides (infor-
mational) privacy into intrusion, public disclosure,
false light, and appropriation. These mean the
following. First, intrusion into one’s private affairs
includes trespassing, search, and remote intrusion
such as wire tapping. Second is public disclosure
of private facts. Third is publicly portraying the
victim in a false light, e.g., by misattributing to
the victim a statement or opinion. Fourth is appro-
priation, or pretending to be the victim for one’s
own advantage. Daniel Solove has constructed a
taxonomy of privacy concepts based on Prosser’s
formulation. It is shown in Figure 1 as a general
overview of informational privacy concerns. We
use the highest level of Solove’s hierarchy for 1.a.i-
iv.
1.b.i-ii Privacy could be defined in terms of
one’s personal space or territory. These concepts
are found readily in proxemics literature as well as
in psychology and ethology (i.e., animal behavior
studies) in general, but are not often connected
with privacy. Patricia Newell includes territoriality
in her review of Perspectives on Privacy [12],
although she also cites a study that separates
between the two [19]. Leino-Kilpi et al. [9] define
physical privacy as being over personal space and
territory, and Westin also mentions it when he links
human privacy ideas with animal behavior [11].
Social psychologist Irwin Altman pulls together
the related concepts of privacy, personal space,
Fig. 1. Daniel Solove’s visual “model” of his taxonomy of
(informational) privacy [10].
territoriality, and crowding [14]. His book, along
with Burgoon’s article [13] (discussed below), is
a good foundation for environmental and spatial
factors related to privacy.
Judee Burgoon presents a communication per-
spective on privacy, including territoriality, in a
broad survey [13]. She argues that more “physical”
privacy could consist of blocking more communi-
cation channels, including sight, sound, and even
smell (e.g., the smell of food being cooked next
door). We would add further channels enabled by
technology: phone calls, text messages, Facebook
posts, and the like. Alternatively, Burgoon writes
that to have more territory, higher-quality territory
(e.g., better-insulated walls), and more unques-
tioned control over that territory is to enjoy more
physical privacy.
1.b.iii Allen lists modesty as an important phys-
ical privacy concern in medical settings, especially
from the philosophical standpoints of Christian
ethics and virtue ethics [15]. Modesty may drive
patients to request same-sex or even same-race
doctors.
1.c.i According to Westin’s account of privacy
in U.S. law, the right to privacy swelled in the late
1900’s [11]. The Supreme Court continued to try
cases in which new technologies created privacy
concerns beyond physical entry and tangible items.
According to Westin, new protections included
“associational privacy” over group memberships
(this is distinct from 1.d.i) and “political privacy”
over unfair questioning on account of political
positions.
1.c.ii Proxemics can include psychological dis-
tance as well as physical distance (see Hall [16]
cited by Mumm and Mutlu [20]).
1.d.i and iv Privacy might also include solitude,
i.e., being physically removed from other people.
Solitude is more than a freedom from trespassing;
one needn’t be at home to desire solitude. Anita
Allen includes solitude in her article on privacy
and medicine [15]. In the medical setting, the
sick often want to be comforted by company,
but also to have some time alone. This could be
especially true for patients with terminal illnesses,
who might want to reflect on their lives and
make some important decisions. In such cases we
tend to respect their wishes. Allen also mentions
“associational privacy,” the ability to choose one’s
own company [15]. She notes that patients do
not merely desire intimacy, but rather “selective
intimacy” with certain loved ones, and this is an
aspect of privacy to consider.
1.d.ii Altman calls both crowding and isolation
failures to regulate the amount of interaction with
others [14]. It may seem odd to call social isolation
a privacy issue, but it is a logical conclusion from
within Altman’s theory of privacy (see Appendix).
1.d.iii Lisa Austin offers a more nuanced defini-
tion of privacy: freedom from “public gaze” [17].
She argues that this updated definition deals with
the problem of new technologies to which older
definitions of privacy do not object. In particular,
Austin is concerned about cases wherein people
know they are under surveillance, about the col-
lection of non-intimate but personal information
(e.g., in data mining), and about the collection of
personal information in public. She claims that
other, older definitions of privacy do not agree
with our intuition that these technologies (could)
invade our privacy by denying us our freedom from
“public gaze.”
1.d.iv-vii Alan Westin lists four different states
of privacy: solitude, anonymity, intimacy (i.e., be-
ing alone with someone), and reserve (i.e., keeping
to oneself) [11].
IV. FUTURE WORK
This taxonomy takes the broad concept of pri-
vacy and breaks it into more specific constructs.
We have split the single trunk into what we see
as its main branches, and some of those branches
have also been shown to fork off, too. To study
privacy in human-robot interaction (e.g., in human-
subject experiments), we need the leaves of this
privacy tree. Unlike the trunk and branches, the
leaves are no longer abstract constructs; instead,
they are concrete measures. For example, one op-
erationalization of personal information collection
(1.a.ii) would be whether someone knows your
social security number – a simple, binary measure.
Other measures might be contextual, e.g., given
that you are alone in a room with a PR2 robot
staring at you, do you feel comfortable chang-
ing your shirt? This comfort level, a proxy for
modesty (1.b.iii), could be measured, for example,
by a questionnaire. All such measures would tap
the extent to which a person’s privacy has been
preserved or violated.
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APPENDIX
Here we add some very important theories about
privacy that didn’t make it into this paper because
they are too general, but are essential for under-
standing privacy as a whole (and hence any one
construct in our taxonomy).
Altman’s theory defines privacy as a boundary
regulation process wherein people try to achieve
their ideal privacy state by using certain mech-
anisms to regulate interaction with others [14].
Notice how this definition allows privacy to some-
times mean more interaction with others, and
sometimes less interaction; successfully switching
between the two is the key. Along these lines,
Altman calls privacy a dialectic process, i.e., a
contest between two opposing forces – withdrawal
and engagement – which alternate in dominance.
Hence, privacy to Altman is dynamic in that the
desired level of engagement changes over time
for a given individual. This theory is necessary
for understanding Altman’s discussion of personal
space, territoriality, and crowding.
Helen Nissenbaum’s approach to privacy, which
she calls “contextual integrity,” focuses on the
idea that different norms of information gather-
ing and dissemination are observed in different
contexts [21]. Privacy is violated in a given con-
text when the norms for information gathering
or dissemination within that context are broken.
Nissenbaum argues that some scenarios, especially
public surveillance, are intuitively felt by many to
be potential privacy violations, and that while U.S.
legal policy overlooked these scenarios (at time of
writing), “contextual integrity” does a better job of
accounting for our intuitive concerns [21].
Adam Moore defines privacy as, “control over
access to oneself and information about oneself”
[22]. This is a “control-based” definition of pri-
vacy, in which it doesn’t matter whether some-
body accesses you or your information, but rather
whether you can control that access. Control-
based definitions account for situations in which
someone invites others into his close company,
or willingly gives out personal information. These
actions would violate privacy if privacy is the state
of being let alone, or of having all your personal
information kept to yourself. But authors holding
to control-based definitions of privacy maintain
that the person in question is still in control, so
there’s no violation; this especially makes sense in
the legal context.
Julie Inness wrote the book on privacy as it
relates to intimacy [23]. She proposes that intimate
interactions must be motivated by liking, love, or
care in order to be intimate. As evidence she points
to Supreme Court decisions wherein constitutional
privacy protection was conferred to issues of the
family and sexual health due to the personal,
emotional impacts that made those issues intimate.
In this way, Inness seems to define privacy as
the protection of intimate matters, where intimacy
comes from the motivation and not the behavior
itself (e.g., kissing is not automatically intimate).
She recognizes that this definition of intimacy is
subjective, making legal rulings more difficult.
